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PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
WITH ENDOGENOUS PRICE MARKUP: COMMENT 
by Luís F. Costa
∗ and Nuno Palma
† 
In a recent article Chen et al. (2005) analyse the role of government expenditure 
in an imperfectly competitive static model, introducing a government-
expenditure externality through the production function. Our purpose in the 
present paper is to argue that the claim from the authors that their model 
generates an endogenous markup is in our view incorrect. We argue that their 
model does not contain an endogenous markup, but a fixed one and that their 
claim is based upon an incorrect interpretation of what is the marginal cost in 
their own model. 
1. Introduction 
In a recent article in Oxford Economic Papers,  Chen et al. (2005) analyse the role 
of government expenditure in an imperfectly competitive static model, following the 
Dixon (1987), Mankiw (1988), and Startz (1989) approach, but introducing a 
government-expenditure externality through the production function. The authors 
claim this gives rise to an endogenous “(…) ‘markup,’ which is used to measure the 
degree of monopoly” - Chen et al. (2005), p. 527. The purpose of this paper is to 
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argue that their model does not contain an endogenous markup, but a fixed one, and 
that their claim is based upon an incorrect interpretation of what is the marginal cost 
in their own model. 
Section 2 presents the markup definitions used in the literature and discusses the 
importance of a variable markup. Section 3 presents the micro-foundations of the 
original paper and compare their markup measure with the standard ones. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Markup Definitions and Usage 
When firms have the power to set prices facing downward-sloping demand curves, 
monopoly (market) power can be measured by the wedge between the marginal cost 
of production (MC) and the price paid by the buyer (p), wedge that the seller can keep 
to him/herself. 
In order to quantify it, there are two main measures of market power in the 
literature: 
- the Lerner index, more popular in the IO literature, that is defined as λ = (p - 
MC)/p ∈ [0, 1]; 
- the price-cost wedge, used more often in the Macroeconomics literature, that is 
defined as z = p/MC ∈ [1, +∞].              
   Both measures are connected by the monotonic relationship λ = 1 – 1/z, and a larger 
value for either λ or z implies a higher degree of monopoly power. 
As noticed by  Barro and Tenreyro (2006): COMMENT ON PRODUCTIVE EXPENDITURE AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION… 3 
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From the standpoint of generating fluctuations in aggregate economic activity, movements 
in markups – reflecting shifts in the extent of competition – work similarly to the technological 
disturbances usually stressed in real business cycles (RBC) models. 
For an excellent survey on the importance of endogenous markups in 
macroeconomics see  Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). 
However, markup fluctuations are not the only source of endogenous variability in 
the overall efficiency level in the economy available in the macroeconomic literature. 
Several types of externality also affect ‘observed’ total (private) factor productivity, 
as measured by the Solow residual, and they are not due to fluctuations in market 
power. 
3. Micro-Foundations and Markup in  Chen et al. (2005) 
The original article here discussed presents a closed economy populated by n - a 
large number of -  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic producers, each one using 
the following technology to generate a differentiated product variety: 
(1)  ( ) , ii yf L G =  ,  i = 1, 2, …, n 
where yi represents the output of firm i, Li is its labour input, and G is government 
expenditure (on infrastructure). Here, firm i obtains its labour in a competitive labour 
market at a wage rate w, and G is a public good available to all firms a zero price. 
Furthermore, we know that fL > 0, fLL < 0, fG > 0, fGG < 0, and fLG O 0, where fu = ∂f/∂u 
and fuv = ∂
2f/(∂u∂v), with u, v = L, G. Thus, government expenditure works as a 
positive externality in production as it is a non-rival non-excludable input for firms. 4 LUÍS COSTA AND NUNO PALMA 
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Here, ‘labour demand’ for firm i can be written as 
(2)  ( ) , ii Ly G φ =  ,  i = 1, 2, …, n 
where φ1 ≡ ∂φ/∂yi = 1/fL > 0 and φ2 ≡ ∂φ/∂G = -fG/fL < 0. 
In the model produced by Chen et al. (2005), neither of the two measures 
mentioned above (λ or z) is used. In fact, the authors use a price-wage ratio - see 
equation (9) and the following line in page 527 of the original article: 













where σ is the price (pi) elasticity of demand faced by producer i. We believe this 
approach is incorrect, as the wage rate does not correspond to the marginal cost of the 
model (in which case the measure used would be the price-cost wedge, which we 
believe the authors were trying to calculate). 
   We will now discuss why the marginal cost is not equivalent to the wage rate in this 
model. In a model where labour is the only private input acquired by firms, as in this 
case, total cost is given by TCi = w.Li = w.φ(yi,G) and consequently the marginal cost 
is MCi = ∂TCi/∂yi = w/fL = w.φ1(yi,G). Note that the marginal cost would only be equal 
to the wage rate if and only if the production function was yi=1.Li (no externality and 
unit average labour productivity). 
   Several  additional  issues  need  clarification at this point. First, there is no 
mathematical reason why µ (the reciprocal of the real wage in a symmetric 
equilibrium) should be bounded below by 1, with the general production function 
chosen. The value of φ1 is expressed in units of labour per unit of good i, thus its COMMENT ON PRODUCTIVE EXPENDITURE AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION… 5 
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numerical value clearly depends on the choice of units which does not guarantee the 
expression is larger than unity. 
   Second, and most seriously, is the fact that using an appropriate markup measure we 
obtain λ = 1/σ and z = σ/(σ − 1) a fixed markup. Despite the fact that labour is the 
only private input, and that labour demand is affected by fiscal policy, the monopoly 
power is not affected by fiscal policy. This should be clear when we observe the 
demand function faced by firm i in equation (3) of the original article, and the market 
structure assumed (Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition): the price elasticity of 
demand faced by each producer is fixed and there is no way the market share of each 
producer would vary under a symmetric equilibrium. 
It is important to note, once again, that µ is nothing else than the reciprocal of the 
real wage. What the authors have in this paper is no more than a fluctuating real 
wage: the real wage depends positively on government expenditure in infrastructure, 
and nevertheless the markup remains fixed. What does vary with fiscal policy here is 
the marginal cost. However, this also happens (indirectly) in all general-equilibrium 
models, even in perfectly competitive ones. What is new in Chen et al. (2005) is the 
positive externality in production that may decrease the marginal cost instead of 
increasing it via equilibrium production and wages. 
Finally, notice that µ still varies with G when σ → ∞, i.e. when there is perfect 
competition. Obviously, it does not make any sense to have an endogenous markup 
under perfect competition. In fact, the results in Chen et al. (2005) have nothing to do 
with markup variation: they are driven by an externality that is closer to the effects of 
increasing returns to specialisation as in Devereux et al. (1996) or love for variety in 6 LUÍS COSTA AND NUNO PALMA 
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Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996). For a model studying the effects of a really 
endogenous markup (entry in a Cournotian model) within the Dixon-Mankiw-Startz 
framework see Costa (2004). 
4. Conclusion 
In this comment it is shown that Chen et al. (2005) produced a model where the 
markup is fixed due to an incorrect identification of the marginal cost for their typical 
firm. Therefore, their claim that government expenditure in infrastructure affects the 
markup is incorrect and changes in labour efficiency are solely due to the direct effect 
of government expenditure on the production function (a positive externality). 
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